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INTRODUCTION 
Fans of Major League Baseball (“MLB” or “Baseball”) have 
long voiced their displeasure with the league’s broadcast 
restrictions and blackout rules.1  However, despite MLB 
Commissioner Bud Selig’s candid recognition of the harm 
caused by television viewership restrictions, the league has 
failed to take significant steps to remedy the problem.2  
Consequently, in May 2012, baseball fans filed an antitrust 
lawsuit against MLB, several individual MLB clubs, and the 
regional sports networks (“RSNs”) and multivideo 
programming distributors (“MVPDs”) responsible for 
producing and distributing broadcasts of MLB games on 
television.3  The crux of the complaint is that Baseball’s 
broadcasting plan is implemented through illegal horizontal 
agreements that protect clubs against competition for 
television viewership in their home territories.4 
In Laumann v. National Hockey League,5 Judge Shira 
Scheindlin of the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York denied the defendants’ motion 
to dismiss, holding that the complaint adequately stated a 
claim for harm to competition in the market for broadcasts of 
 
 1.  See Jeff Wolf, Decades-old blackout rules leave Major League Baseball fans in 
the dark, LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL (April 24, 2011, 9:01 AM), 
http://www.lvrj.com/sports/decades-old-blackout-rules-leave-major-league-baseball-fans-
in-the-dark-120563299.html; Jeff Passan, MLB’s blackout problem keeps sport in dark 
ages, YAHOO! SPORTS (June 22, 2012, 10:06 AM), http://sports.yahoo.com/ 
news/mlb%E2%80%99s-blackout-problem-keeps-sport-in-dark-ages.html (“In areas 
where it makes no sense to carry a particular RSN, the fans are out of luck even if they 
buy the Extra Innings or MLB.tv packages.”); Jeremy Lacks, End of the Dark Ages? 
Lawsuits Put Sports TV Blackout Rules to the Test, JD SUPRA (Jan. 1, 2013), 
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/end-of-the-dark-ages-lawsuits-put-spor-
81591/#Article5 (“Contemporary fans have long been frustrated by the current 
arrangement.”). 
 2.  Jeff Passan, Selig’s promise, YAHOO! SPORTS (July 11, 2006), 
http://sports.yahoo.com/mlb/news?slug=jp-blackouts071106.  
 3.  As discussed infra Part I, MVPDs are television providers that offer 
programming to subscribers for a fee.  MVPD platforms included cable operators such 
as Comcast and Time Warner Cable, national satellite providers such as DirecTV and 
Dish Network, and large telephone companies such as VerizonFiOS or AT&T.  See 
Video Competition, NAT’L CABLE & TELECOMM. ASS’N, http://www.ncta.com/ 
IssueBriefs/VideoCompetition.aspx (last visited Oct. 29, 2012). 
 4.  See Class Action Complaint, Garber v. Office of the Comm’r of Baseball, No. 12 
CIV 3704, 2012 WL 1609215 (S.D.N.Y.  May 9, 2012).  
 5.  The suit against MLB was consolidated with a similar complaint against the 
National Hockey League.  See Action Complaint, Laumann v. National Hockey League, 
No. 12-1817(KMW), 2012 WL 3019470 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2012).   
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live baseball games.6  The decision was somewhat surprising 
given that a previous challenge to a very similar broadcasting 
arrangement used by the National Basketball Association 
(“NBA”) failed to make it past summary judgment.  In 
Kingray, Inc. v. National Basketball Ass’n, Judge M. James 
Lorenz of the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of California held that a complaint alleging that the 
NBA and DirecTV conspired to raise prices by blacking out 
basketball games failed to state a claim for anticompetitive 
harm.7  While the holding in Laumann is undoubtedly a 
preliminary win for baseball fans aggrieved by the league’s 
blackout policy, the legality of MLB’s model ultimately 
depends on whether the league can show that the harm 
caused by viewership restrictions is justified for other 
procompetitive reasons. 
This Comment compares the holdings in Laumann and 
Kingray and provides insight into the findings a court would 
need to make in order to hold that MLB’s broadcasting plan 
violates antitrust law.  Part I describes the structure of the 
sports television programming market and Baseball’s 
broadcasting model, which implements blackouts through a 
combination of horizontal agreements among clubs and 
vertical agreements between clubs, RSNS, and MVPDs.  
Critics argue that this model is susceptible to antitrust attack 
because it reduces competition between teams and results in 
higher prices for consumers.8  Part II provides a synopsis of 
relevant antitrust law, focusing on the three analytical tests 
courts apply to evaluate the reasonableness of restraints on 
trade.  Examining the circumstances in which each test is 
applied makes it clear that the restraint at issue here should 
be analyzed under the rule of reason.  Part III describes the 
first step in a rule of reason analysis and explains how 
different conceptions of output in the context of sports 
programming led to the different outcomes in Laumann and 
Kingray.  Part III then describes why the analysis in 
 
 6.  Laumann v. Nat’l Hockey League, 907 F. Supp. 2d 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).  
 7.  See Kingray, Inc. v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1184 
(S.D. Cal. 2002). 
 8.  See Stephen F. Ross, Antitrust Options to Redress Anticompetitive Restraints 
and Monopolistic Practices by Professional Sports Leagues, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
133, 144 (2001); Gabriel Feldman, The Puzzling Persistence of the Single-Entity 
Argument for Sports Leagues: American Needle and the Supreme Court’s Opportunity to 
Reject A Flawed Defense, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 835, 888 (2009). 
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Laumann is the sounder approach.  Part IV walks through 
the final two steps of the rule of reason and acknowledges 
that, while MLB’s broadcasting plan harms competition in the 
market for live video presentations of professional baseball 
games, whether it violates the Sherman Act will hinge on 
MLB’s ability to provide procompetitive justifications for its 
conduct.  Part V concludes that MLB’s broadcasting 
distribution model will survive antitrust scrutiny if the court 
finds that that the league’s justifications are legitimate; if the 
justifications are not legally cognizable, the model will be 
declared unlawful. 
I.  MLB’S BROADCASTING PLAN 
A. Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption 
Before examining the details of MLB’s broadcasting model, 
brief mention should be made of the league’s historic antitrust 
exemption, which theoretically could be asserted as a defense 
to any antitrust lawsuit brought against it.9  In 1922, the 
Supreme Court held that Baseball was exempt from the 
antitrust laws because “exhibitions of base ball . . . are purely 
state affairs” and therefore not interstate commerce subject to 
regulation under the Sherman Act.10  Despite acknowledging 
the serious flaws of this holding in the famous Flood v. Kuhn 
decision, the Court nevertheless upheld the exemption, 
declaring that it was the role of Congress—and not the 
Court—to undo it.11  Thus, even if MLB’s broadcast policy 
represents a flagrant violation of antitrust laws, it is possible 
that the league could escape liability by invoking its historic 
exemption. 
 
 9.  See John Woolfolk, Judge questions San Jose lawsuit against MLB over A’s 
move, INSIDE BAY AREA (Oct. 4, 2013, 7:35 AM), http://www.insidebayarea.com/ 
breaking-news/ci_24239070/mlb-seeks-dismissal-san-jose-lawsuit-over-move. 
 10.  Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore v. Nat’l League of Prof’l Base Ball Clubs, 259 
U.S. 200, 208 (1922).  
 11.  Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 285 (1972).  Since the Flood decision, lower courts 
visiting the issue have sought to limit the scope of the exemption, with one court 
holding that it does not apply to radio broadcasts.  Henderson Broad. Corp. v. Houston 
Sports Ass’n, Inc., 659 F. Supp. 109 (S.D. Tex. 1987) (finding that an exclusive 
agreement between a MLB club and a radio station was not immune to antitrust 
challenge because the restraint affected competition in the broadcasting industry, not 
the baseball industry).  But see Nathaniel Grow, In Defense of Baseball’s Antitrust 
Exemption, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 211, 268 (2012). 
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This Comment does not consider the relevance of this 
exemption to the Laumann litigation for two reasons.  First, 
the legal foundation for the exemption is severely outdated,12 
and it seems likely that, should the Court revisit the issue, it 
would find that Baseball’s conduct is covered under the 
antitrust laws.  Second, and relatedly, MLB prefers to avoid 
invoking the exemption—probably out of fear that doing so 
will cause a court to revoke it.13  Tellingly, the defendants in 
Laumann did not even bother to raise this defense.14  Thus, 
other than briefly mentioning it here, this Comment does not 
concern itself with Baseball’s antitrust exemption. 
B. The Sherman Act 
In 1890, Congress passed the Sherman Act (the “Act”),15  
based on the idea that the “unrestrained interaction of 
competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our 
economic resources, the lowest prices, [and] the highest 
quality and greatest material progress.”16  Often referred to as 
Congress’ “consumer welfare prescription,” 17 the purpose of 
the Sherman Act is to provide protection against various 
categories of harmful economic conduct and preserve “free 
and unfettered competition” in the marketplace.18  Section 1 of 
the Act focuses on concerted action—i.e., collusion—among 
competitors.  Although Section 1 condemns “[e]very contract, 
combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade,”19 it is not 
interpreted literally.20  Because almost every business 
contract restrains trade in some way, Section 1 is construed to 
 
 12.  See Flood, 407 U.S. at 286 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).  
 13.  Samuel G. Mann, In Name Only: How Major League Baseball’s Reliance on Its 
Antitrust Exemption Is Hurting the Game, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 587, 600 (2012) 
(“The clearest indication that MLB’s antitrust exemption is irrelevant is the fact that 
MLB often chooses not to assert it. As sports law professor Mitchell Nathanson has 
noted, ‘in an ironic effort to prevent the Sherman Act from applying to it, MLB has 
voluntarily abided by it.’”).  
 14.  See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the 
Complaints, Laumann v. Nat’l Hockey League, 907 F. Supp.2d 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(Nos. 12-cv-1817, 12-cv-37024), 2012 WL 3966118.  
 15.  15 U.S.C. § 1. 
 16.  N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S 1, 4 (1958). 
 17.  Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979).  
 18.  N. Pac. Ry. Co., 356 U.S. at 4. 
 19.  15 U.S.C. § 1. 
 20.  Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc., 457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982).  
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forbid only unreasonable restraints of trade.21  A restraint is 
considered unreasonable if, under the totality of the 
circumstances, its anticompetitive effects outweigh its 
procompetitive effects (in antitrust parlance, such restraints 
are called “net anticompetitive”).22  Section 2 prohibits any 
conduct, concerted or independent, that monopolizes or 
threatens monopolization.23 
Antitrust enforcement has traditionally been more 
concerned with concerted action under Section 1 than with 
monopolization under Section 2.24  This is because the 
ordinary workings of the marketplace are more easily 
disturbed by collaboration between independent economic 
actors to suppress competition than by a single firm’s 
attempts at monopolization.25  The two elements of a Section 1 
claim are: (1) concerted action; and (2) anticompetitive 
harm.26  Although the concept of anticompetitive harm eludes 
precise definition, courts have noted that “antitrust claims are 
concerned not with wrongs directed against the private 
interest of an individual business but with conduct that stifles 
competition.”27  In other words, a restraint presents 
anticompetitive harm when it injures competition, not when it 
merely injures a competitor. 28  Thus, a successful challenge to 
MLB’s blackout policy must prove not only that the 30 MLB 
clubs acted together to restrain trade, but also that the net 
effect of this activity was to injure competition in a relevant 
market. 
 
 21.  See United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668 (3d Cir. 1993) (“§ 1 of the 
Sherman Act has long been interpreted to prohibit only those contracts or combinations 
that are ‘unreasonably restrictive of competitive conditions.’”); Am. Needle, Inc., v. Nat’l 
Football League, 130 S.Ct. 2201, 2208 (2010) (“[E]ven though, ‘read literally,’ § 1 would 
address ‘the entire body of private contract,’ that is not what the statute means.”).  
 22.  Feldman, supra note 8, at 840. 
 23.  15 U.S.C. § 2; see also United States v. E.I. du Pont Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 
377, 391 (1956) (defining monopoly power as “the power to control prices or exclude 
competition.”).  
 24.  See Am. Needle, 130 S.Ct. at 2208 (“[I]n § 1 Congress ‘treated concerted 
behavior more strictly than unilateral behavior.’”).  
 25.  Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).  
 26.  WILLIAM C. HOLMES & MELISSA H. MANGIARACINA, ANTITRUST LAW 
HANDBOOK § 2:3 (2011-2012 ed. 2011).   
 27.  E. Food Services, Inc. v. Pontifical Catholic Univ. Servs. Ass’n, Inc., 357 F.3d 
1,4 (1st Cir. 2004).  
 28.  Brunswick Corp., v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc. 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977) (“[T]he 
antitrust laws were enacted for the ‘protection of competition . . . not competitors.’”) 
(quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)).  
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C. Business Structure of Professional Sports Leagues 
Antitrust challenges to the business of professional sports 
present a difficulty for courts because questions that are often 
easily addressed in the context of conventional industries are 
complicated by the interplay of common and adverse interests 
that define professional sports leagues.  Whereas in most 
industries firms’ decision-making processes are guided 
entirely by the goal of maximizing profits at the expense of 
competitors,29 professional sports franchises must act not only 
in their individual self-interest but also in the best interests 
of the league as a whole.30  The necessity of coordination 
regarding the scheduling of games and league wide 
sponsorships, among other things, complicates the question of 
whether cooperation between clubs amounts to collusion 
between competitors.31 
The Major League Constitution describes the rules that 
govern the relationship between MLB and its clubs.32  This 
contractual agreement provides that league decision-making 
authority is vested in a governing body comprised of 
representatives from each team.33  With the exception of the 
Commissioner, who is chosen by the owners and appointed 
with limited powers such as overseeing the best interests of 
the game, the league is controlled entirely by the clubs and 
their owners.34  Appearances notwithstanding, “[c]lub owners 
do not take their orders from executives at some separate 
organization called ‘Major League Baseball’ . . . they are the 
league, constituting the governing board and setting league 
policy.”35  This organizational structure puts club owners in 
 
 29.  See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusive Joint Ventures and Antitrust 
Policy, 1995 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 53-54 (1995).  
 30.  See Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 538 F.3d 736, 743 (7th Cir. 
2008), rev’d, 130 S.Ct. 2201 (2010) (“NFL teams share a vital economic interest in 
collectively promoting NFL football.  After all, the league competes with other forms of 
entertainment for an audience of finite (if extremely large) size, and the loss of audience 
members to alternative forms of entertainment necessarily impacts the individual 
teams’ success.”).  
 31.  See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 
U.S. 85, 102-03 (1984).  
 32.  See Major League Constitution, http://bizofbaseball.com/docs/MLConsititution 
June2005Update.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 2013). 
 33.  See PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, SPORTS AND THE LAW: TEXT, CASES, 
PROBLEMS 537 (3d ed. 2004). 
 34.  Id.  
 35.  Ross, supra note 8, at 139. 
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the position of having to compete directly against their 
partners in a joint business venture.36  Instead of focusing 
solely on their own profitability, clubs have a significant 
interest in seeing their competitors succeed, which is 
necessary to ensure the success of the league as a whole.37  
Although clubs compete vigorously on the field of play and vie 
for fans and sponsorships, cooperation and restraints on 
competition in some aspects of business are essential to a 
league’s survival.38  Truly “free and unfettered competition,”39 
the hallmark of an ideal marketplace, is simply not possible 
in the sports industry.  The question confronting courts 
concerns how much freedom clubs should have to impose 
restrictions on competition that would, in other industries, 
amount to collusion.  Although in American Needle v. Nat’l 
Football League the Supreme Court established that clubs are 
capable of conspiring in most situations, the full effect of this 
holding remains to be seen.40 
D.  Broadcast Restrictions 
An obvious example of a necessary league-imposed 
restraint on competition is the concept of the exclusive home 
territory.  Home territories give clubs the exclusive right to 
operate a franchise and play home games within a defined 
geographic area.41  The Major League Constitution states that 
the thirty “Major League Clubs shall have assigned operating 
territories within which they have the right and obligation to 
play baseball games as the home Club.”42  Although the 
implementation of exclusive home territories is a clear 
 
 36.  See RAY YASSER, SPORTS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (7th ed. 2011); see also 
N. Am. Soccer League v. Nat’l Football League, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d. Cir. 1982) (noting 
that in order to “attract as many people as possible to pay money to attend games 
between members and to induce advertisers to sponsor TV broadcasts of such games . . . 
some sort of an economic joint venture is essential.  No single owner could engage in 
professional [sports] for profit without at least one other competing team.”). 
 37.  Feldman, supra note 8, at 840. 
 38.  See Dennis W. Carlton et al., The Control of Externalities in Sports Leagues: 
An Analysis of Restrictions in the National Hockey League, 112 J. POL. ECON. S268, 
S269 (2004).  
 39.  N. Pac. R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1958). 
 40.  See American Needle v. National Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2211 
(2010). 
 41.  See Major League Constitution, art. VIII, § 8, http://bizofbaseball.com/docs/ 
MLConsititutionJune2005 Update.pdf. 
 42.  Id.  
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restraint on competition, the necessity of such an 
arrangement is obvious.  Without territorial restrictions, 
clubs could schedule home games in any location without 
regard to the effect on other clubs, and there would be nothing 
to stop a struggling franchise from moving to a larger market 
where it could siphon fans away from an indigenous team. 
While home market protections initially provided the 
economic protection needed to encourage owners to invest in 
fledgling leagues, the advent of television broadcasting 
threatened their effectiveness and led to the adoption of 
exclusive “home television territories.”43  Article X of the 
Major League Constitution states, “each Club shall have, with 
respect to each game in which it participates, the right to 
authorize the telecast of such game only by means of over-the-
air, cable and satellite technology, and only within its home 
television territory.”44  Thus, just as each club agrees not to 
play games in another club’s home territory, each club agrees 
not to distribute live broadcasts of its games outside its local 
geographic region.  This model ensures that, for example, the 
New York Yankees and their RSN partner have the exclusive 
right to televise their games within their home territory.  In 
exchange, the Yankees and their RSN and MVPD partners 
agree to refrain from distributing telecasts outside of this 
territory, into, say, the home territory of the Philadelphia 
Phillies.  A broadcast of a game by a local RSN into a club’s 
home territory is referred to as an “in-market” broadcast.45   
In addition to providing the rules that govern clubs’ local 
broadcast rights, Article X provides that the Commissioner 
has the authority to negotiate contracts for national 
broadcasts on behalf of the clubs.46  While revenue from local 
 
 43.  Id. at art. VIII, § 9.  
 44.  Id. at art. X, § 3(a).  
 45.  See Laumann v. Nat’l Hockey League, 907 F. Supp.2d 465, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(defining “in-market” games as “games played by the team in whose designated home 
territory the subscriber resides.”). 
 46.  See Major League Constitution, art. X, § 4, http://bizofbaseball.com/docs/ 
MLConsititutionJune2005 Update.pdf (“[T]he Major League Clubs grant to the 
Commissioner, acting as their agent . . . the exclusive right to sell on their behalf, 
throughout the United States and other territories as chosen by the Commissioner, 
exclusive or non-exclusive television and radio or other video or audio media rights 
(including the Internet and any other online technology).”  Although by the middle of 
the twentieth century it had already been established that the right to control 
broadcasts of a live sporting event belonged to the clubs participating in the match, 
MLB clubs later ceded the right to broadcast their games to a national audience to the 
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television contracts belongs to the clubs themselves, revenues 
from national television contracts are considered the collective 
property of all clubs and divided evenly among them.47  The 
Commissioner has used his authority in this area to make live 
video presentations of games available through three different 
media: national television broadcasts on over-the-air 
networks or cable channels, such as Fox and ESPN;48 a 
subscriber-based television package known as “MLB Extra 
Innings” carried by many cable and satellite providers;49  and 
a subscriber-based internet package known as MLB.tv.50  
Because these broadcasts are available to consumers 
throughout the United States—as opposed to only local fans 
within a team’s home territory—they are referred to as “out-
of-market” broadcast packages.51 
E.  The Blackout Problem 
MLB’s broadcasting plan draws the ire of fans because any 
in-market game available on a local RSN is automatically 
blacked out for purchasers of MLB Extra Innings and 
MLB.tv.52  This means that if an out-of-market package 
 
Commissioner.  See Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 
(W.D.P.A. 1938); Weiler & Roberts, supra note 33, at 635.  
 47.  Marc Edelman, Why the “Single Entity” Defense Can Never Apply to NFL 
Clubs: A Primer on Property Rights Theory in Professional Sports, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 891, 917 (2008).  
 48.  For example, MLB agreed to new national television contracts with Fox, TBS, 
and ESPN in 2012.  See John Ourand, ESPN Signs New Deal with MLB Through ‘21 
Worth An Average of $700M Annually, SPORTS BUSINESS DAILY, 
http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Daily/Issues/ 2012/08/28/Media/MLB-ESPN.aspx 
(Aug. 28, 2012); John Ourand, Fox, Turner contribute to $12 billion rights haul for 
MLB, SPORTS BUSINESS JOURNAL, http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/ 
2012/09/24/Media/MLB-12B.aspx (Sept. 24, 2012). 
 49.  For instance, the “Extra Innings” package is offered by DIRECTV. See 
http://www.directv.com/sports/mlb (last visited Oct. 29, 2012).  
 50.  See MLB.TV, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/subscriptions/index.jsp?&c_id=mlb& 
affiliateId=mlb (last visited Oct. 7, 2013).  
 51.  Stephen F. Ross, An Antitrust Analysis of Sports League Contracts with Cable 
Networks, 39 EMORY L.J. 463, 475 (“Package sales of broadcast rights are agreements 
among individual clubs, who could otherwise sell rights to broadcast their own games, 
to forego such independence in order to receive the presumably higher prices that such 
packages attract.”). 
 52.  The MLB describes its “Regular Season Local Live Blackout” policy for 
MLB.TV as follows:  
All live games on MLB.TV and available through MLB.com At Bat are subject 
to local blackouts. Such live games will be blacked out in each applicable 
Club’s home television territory, regardless of whether that Club is playing at 
LISOVICZ_PROTECTING HOME.DOCX  6/2/2014  4:59 PM 
2014] Protecting Home 213 
subscriber resides within the home television territory of one 
of the clubs involved in a game, she will be unable to use the 
package to watch the game.  For instance, the broadcast of a 
game between the Yankees and the Phillies will not be 
available to a MLB Extra Innings subscriber if the subscriber 
lives within the home television territory of the Yankees or 
the Phillies.  To watch the game, the fan would have to 
purchase a television package that includes either the 
Yankees’ or Phillies’ RSN. 
This problem can be significantly more inconvenient for 
baseball fans with the misfortune of living in a region of the 
country designated as the home television territory of more 
than one club.  For example, Hawaii is considered the home 
territory of the San Diego Padres, Oakland Athletics, Los 
Angeles Dodgers, Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim, San 
Francisco Giants, and Seattle Mariners.53  This means that 
any game featuring one of these six teams is blacked on MLB 
Extra Innings or MLB.tv in Hawaii.  If a fan wants to watch a 
game played by one of these teams, he must subscribe to a 
MVPD that carries the team’s RSN.  The problem is, in-
market games are blacked out regardless of whether a MVPD 
that services the area carries the RSN.54  Thus, fans of the 
Seattle Mariners or the San Diego Padres living in Hawaii are 
unable to watch their favorite team’s games; they cannot 
purchase a cable or satellite television package that carries 
the clubs’ RSN partners, and the games are blacked out on 
MLB Extra Innings and MLB.tv because Hawaii is in the 
Mariners’ and Padres’ home television territories.55 
 
home or away. If a game is blacked out in an area, it is not available for live 
game viewing. If you are an MLB.TV subscriber and not within either Club’s 
home television territory, the applicable game will be available live and as an 
archived game as soon as possible after the conclusion of the game. If you are 
an MLB.TV subscriber within either Club’s home television territory or an 
MLB.TV subscriber in any territory, the applicable game will be available as 
an archived game approximately 90 minutes after the conclusion of the game. 
In addition, note: These blackout restrictions apply regardless of whether a 
Club is home or away and regardless of whether or not a game is televised in a 
Club’s home television territory. All live Toronto Blue Jays games are blacked 
out throughout the entire country of Canada.  
MLB.TV http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/subscriptions/index.jsp?affiliateId=MLBTVREDIR 
#blackout (last visited Oct. 23, 2012).   
 53.  Passan, supra note 1.   
 54.  Id.  
 55.  Id. (“In areas where it makes no sense to carry a particular RSN, the fans are 
out of luck even if they buy the Extra Innings or MLB.tv packages.”).   
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According to a MLB press release touting the grant of a 
patent for the technology used to determine the location of a 
fan using the MLB.tv package, these restrictions are 
necessary because “[a]ll clubs have local TV broadcast 
rightsholders, and their contracts specify that fans inside a 
defined geographical radius who can view their broadcasts 
shall be blacked out from live online viewing.”56  The website 
for DirecTV explains the limitations as follows: 
In our agreements with sports leagues and associations, we are 
restricted from showing events near where a game is played or 
broadcast locally . . . . It’s important to understand that blackouts 
and game availability are controlled by the leagues, associations, 
and networks that purchase the rights to broadcast individual 
games. To protect their rights, DIRECTV must enforce the 
restrictions mandated by them.57 
Given that this arrangement has the effect of reducing the 
total number of broadcasts available to fans, it is natural to 
wonder why it exists at all.  Is it not in MLB’s best interest to 
make as many games available on television as possible?  The 
structure of the vertical distribution channel that transmits 
broadcasts from stadiums to fans’ living rooms helps explain 
why clubs agree to restrict output in this way. 
F.  Local Market Distribution: Clubs, RSNs, and MVPDs 
Although local markets for sports television programming 
can take a variety of shapes, the first level of the distribution 
channel for sports programming always consists of the 
upstream vertical relationship between clubs and RSNs.58  At 
this level, clubs sell the exclusive right to broadcast their 
games to a RSN.59  Because RSN programming is among the 
 
 56.  Mark Newman, MLB.TV granted landmark U.S. patent, MLB.COM, (May 14, 
2009, 11:00 AM), http://mlb.mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20090514&content_id= 
4724126&vkey=news_ mlb&fext=.jsp&c_id=mlb.  
 57.  Why was a nationally televised game not shown in my area? DIRECTV, 
http://support.directv.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/32/kw/blackouts (last visited Oct. 29, 
2012).  
 58.  See Yankees Entm’t and Sports Network, LLC v. Cablevision Sys. Co., 224 F. 
Supp. 2d 657, 663 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Diana Moss, Regional Sports Networks, Competition, 
and the Consumer, 21 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 56, 60 (2008).  
 59.  Yankees, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 663 (describing this level as “the sale by the 
owners/creators of sporting events of their rights to televise to owners of Programming 
Networks.”).  
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most valuable programming on television,60 bidding between 
RSNs competing in the same market is often intense.61  In 
recent years RSNs have shelled out increasingly exorbitant 
sums for these exclusive rights.62  For instance, the recently 
launched Time Warner Cable SportsNet reportedly agreed to 
pay the Los Angeles Lakers $3 billion for the exclusive right 
to broadcast Lakers’ games for the next 20 years.63 
The second level of the distribution channel consists of the 
sale of RSN programming to MVPDs.64  MVPDs are television 
providers that offer programming to subscribers for a fee.65  
MVPD platforms include: cable operators, such as Comcast 
and Time Warner Cable; national satellite providers, such as 
DirecTV and Dish Network; and large telephone companies, 
such as VerizonFiOS and AT&T.66  Because the exclusive 
right to broadcast a club’s games is extremely valuable, RSNs 
often demand a premium from MVPDs for the right to carry 
their channels.67  For instance, Time Warner Cable reportedly 
 
 60.  See Brian Stelter, Rising TV Fees Mean All Viewers Pay to Keep Sports Fans 
Happy, NY TIMES (Jan. 25, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/26/ 
business/media/all-viewers-pay-to-keep-tv-sports-fans-happy.html?_r=0.  One reason 
the value of sports programming has skyrocketed in recent years is that its fan base 
provides a guaranteed live audience that cannot use digital video recording technology 
to avoid commercial advertising.  See Michael Heistand, MLB, FOX and Turner finally 
make TV deals official, USA TODAY (Oct. 2, 2012, 12:31 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/ 
story/gameon/2012/10/02/mlb-turner-sports-tbs-espn-fox/1608173/ (noting that despite a 
trend in which “consumers steadily move toward watching TV on an on-demand basis,” 
live sports remain “relatively immune to being watched on a taped basis.”).   
 61.  Moss, supra note 58, at 57 (“Competition between RSNs in bidding for team 
media rights . . . is often quite fierce.”).  
 62.  See Stelter, supra note 60.   
 63.  Tom Hoffarth, Laker-centric Time Warner Cable channels launch Monday, but 
so far distribution is limited, DAILY NEWS LOS ANGELES (Sept. 28, 2012, 8:45 AM), 
http://www.dailynews.com/ci_21650164/laker-centric-time-warner-cable-channels-
launch-monday?source=most_viewed.  
 64.  Yankees, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 663 (describing this level as “the purchase and 
sale of programming of local professional sporting events” between “Programming 
Networks and various MVPDs, such as cable operators, for delivery to their 
subscribers.”). 
 65.  Under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, “the term ‘multichannel video 
programming distributor’ means a person such as, but not limited to, a cable operator, a 
multichannel multipoint distribution service, a direct broadcast satellite service, or a 
television receive-only satellite program distributor, who makes available for purchase, 
by subscribers or customers, multiple channels of video programming.” 47 U.S.C. § 
522(13) (2013); see also Yankees, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 662 (describing a MVPD as a 
television operator that “provides pay television programming within its service area.”).  
 66.  See Video Competition, NAT’L CABLE & TELECOMM. ASS’N, 
http://www.ncta.com/IssueBriefs/VideoCompetition.aspx (last visited Oct. 29, 2012).  
 67.  See Moss, supra note 58, at 57 (“RSN programming . . . is a unique product, of 
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demanded $3.95 per month per subscriber from MVPDs for 
the right to carry the new Time Warner Cable SportsNet 
channel.68  Unsurprisingly, negotiations between RSNs and 
MVPDs for the rights to carry RSN programming can be quite 
contentious.69 
The final level of the distribution channel consists of the 
downstream purchase of MVPD services (i.e., cable or satellite 
television subscriptions) by baseball fans and other 
consumers.70  After deciding on a cable or satellite provider, 
consumers typically choose between different subscription 
packages that offer various levels of sports programming.71  
Avid fans of a particular league may supplement an ordinary 
sports television package with the purchase of an out-of-
market product such as MLB Extra Innings. 
The structure of the sports programming market shows 
that the agreements among clubs not to compete in each 
other’s home television territories are enforced through 
downstream contractual agreements between clubs, RSNs, 
and MVPDs.72  That the horizontal agreement to restrict the 
distribution of broadcasts is enforced through vertical 
blackout agreements complicates the antitrust analysis.  
However, if consumers can prove that they suffered an 
antitrust injury as a result of reduced output or artificially 
 
tremendous value to a certain segment of consumers, and thus access to it is crucial to 
cable and satellite providers’ ability to remain competitive.”) (quoting Time 
Warner/Comcast/Adelphia, Statement of Commissioners Jon Leibowitz and Pamela 
Jones Harbour (Concurring in Part, Dissenting in Part), January 31, 2006, File No. 
051-0151, available at http:// www.ftc.gov/os/closings/ftc/0510151twadelphialeibowitz_ 
harbour.pdf).  
 68.  Hoffarth, supra note 63.   
 69.  See Moss, supra note 58, at 57; Joe Flint, Time Warner Cable ready to play 
hardball over Dodger channel, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Jan. 22, 2014, 11:41 AM) 
http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/envelope/cotown/la-et-ct-dodgers-sportsnet-time-
warner-cable-20140122,0,7610460.story#axzz2rcPb3Jx4.  
 70.  Yankees, 224 F. Supp. 2d at 663 (noting that “distribution of multi-channel 
programming . . . involves the purchase and sale of pay television services between 
competing MVPDs and the residents and business in their respective service areas.”). 
 71.  See Moss, supra note 58, at 58 (noting that RSNs are offered to subscribers “in 
the form of sports channels and other premium sports packages.”). 
 72.  One such downstream agreement was analyzed in Kingray—discussed infra 
Part III—when blackout language in the NBA’s contract with DirecTV provided that 
“DirecTV is to refrain from distributing within the home market of an NBA team any 
game that has already been licensed to a local telecaster or cablecaster for telecast 
within the team’s home market, except where DirecTV has been authorized to televise 
the game as part of DirecTV’s carriage of a regional sports network.” Kingray, Inc. v. 
Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1193 (S.D. Cal. 2002). 
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high prices, then they likely have standing to challenge 
Baseball’s policy.73 
II. THE APPROPRIATE LEGAL TEST 
A. Three Tests of Reasonableness 
Over time, courts have developed three tests for 
evaluating the reasonableness of a challenged restraint on 
trade: (1) the per se rule; (2) the quick look; and (3) the rule of 
reason.74  The range of different tests creates a “continuum, 
on which the ‘amount and range of information needed’ to 
evaluate a restraint varies depending on how ‘highly 
suspicious’ and how ‘unique’ the restraint is.”75  While the 
ultimate issue addressed is always whether the challenged 
conduct is unreasonable, these tests give courts discretion 
when allocating burdens of proof and enable courts to tailor 
the level of scrutiny applied to a restraint according to the 
level harm it presents to competition on its face.76 
Due to the complicated structure of the sports 
broadcasting market, which involves both horizontal and 
vertical restraints, arguments can be made for evaluating 
MLB’s blackout policy under each of the three tests. 
B. Per Se Rule 
The per se rule applies when a challenged restraint 
presents obvious competitive harm and lacks “any redeeming 
 
 73.  A legally cognizable “antitrust injury” is defined as an “injury of the type the 
antitrust laws were intended to prevent.”  Brunswick Corp., v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc. 
429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).  The substance of this requirement is that the defendant’s 
conduct must result in harm to competition itself as opposed to merely harm to a 
competitor.  See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).  In other 
words, conduct will not be deemed to have caused antitrust injury merely because it 
causes a competitor to lose profits or consumers to pay higher prices—the lost profits or 
higher prices must be the result of “a competition-reducing aspect or effect of the 
defendant’s behavior.”  Atl. Richfield Co., v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 344 
(1990). 
 74.  United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668-69 (3d Cir. 1993).  
 75.  Cont’l Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 277 F. 3d 499, 509 (4th Cir. 2002).  
 76.  ANDREW I. GAVIL, ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS 
AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 186 (2d ed. 2008) (noting that the quick look 
test, like the per se rule, “can be understood in evidentiary terms as a burden-shifting 
device.”).  
LISOVICZ_PROTECTING HOME.DOCX  6/2/2014  4:59 PM 
218 Seton Hall Journal of Sports and Entertainment Law [Vol. 24 
virtue” or legitimate purpose in the marketplace.77  In the 
interest of judicial efficiency, courts will strike down practices 
that fit into this category without engaging in an inquiry into 
the restraint’s reasonableness.78  Although in earlier periods 
the per se rule was applied to a wide range of anticompetitive 
practices,79 modern economics and changing understandings 
of the purpose of antitrust law have limited its application to  
“naked”80 restraints, such as horizontal price-fixing 
agreements between competitors.81  Because such conduct is 
“so plainly anticompetitive,”82 courts can refuse to consider 
any potential justifications offered by a defendant and simply 
declare the practice “illegal per se.”83 
Despite how rarely the per se test is applied today, one can 
argue that it should be applied to MLB’s conduct because its 
television plan is implemented through a “horizontal market 
allocation” among clubs.  A horizontal market allocation is an 
agreement among competitors not to compete in certain 
geographic areas.84  Because such agreements preclude 
competition entirely, they have the potential to be even more 
harmful than horizontal price-fixing agreements, which at 
least allow competitors to compete on the basis of qualities 
 
 77.  N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S 1, 5 (1958). 
 78.  Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., 610 F.3d 820, 829 (3rd Cir. 2010) 
(“Some categories of restraints, such as horizontal price-fixing and market allocation 
agreements among competitors, ‘because of their pernicious effect on competition and 
lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable.’”). 
 79.  See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Reconciling the Per Se and Rule of Reason 
Approaches to Antitrust Analysis, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 685, 693 (1991) (explaining that by 
the 1960s the Supreme Court “had applied the per se rule to tying arrangements, 
horizontal territorial or customer allocations  . . . group boycotts . . . and nonprice 
vertical restrictions imposed by a supplier on its distributors.”). 
 80.  Naked restraints are restraints with “no purpose except stifling of 
competition.” They may be contrasted with “ancillary” restraints, which are restraints 
that are a necessary part of a larger agreement that serves some purpose other than 
merely restraining trade. Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys. 441 U.S. 1, 20 
(1979); see also United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel, 85 F. 271, 282 (1898). 
 81.  Horizontal price-fixing occurs when “direct or potential competitors at the 
same level of the market structure agree upon the prices that they will charge 
customers or pay suppliers. HOLMES & MANGIARACINA, supra note 26, at § 2:2; see also 
GAVIL, supra note 76, at 352. 
 82.  Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 7 n.3 (2006). 
 83.  HOLMES & MANGIARACINA, supra note 26, at § 2:8.   
 84.  See WILLIAM C. HOLMES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW § 5:5 
(2013) (defining a horizontal market allocation as “an agreement among existing or 
potential direct competitors to divide or otherwise restrict territories, output, 
customers, or product or service markets among themselves.”). 
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other than price.85  For this reason, horizontal market 
allocations are highly suspicious and have traditionally been 
considered illegal per se. 
One of the best-known examples of a court applying the 
per se rule to a horizontal market allocation comes from 
United States v. Topco Associates, Inc.86  There, 25 small 
grocery store chains formed a cooperative association to 
market a line of groceries under the brand name “Topco,” with 
each member being assigned a de facto exclusive territory.87  
Despite the fact that the members collectively possessed only 
a small market share, the Supreme Court issued a broad 
condemnation of horizontal agreements between competitors, 
declaring that the “restraint in this case is a horizontal one, 
and therefore, a per se violation of Sec. 1.”88  Although 
Baseball’s home territory arrangement shares the key 
features of the agreement in Topco, a court would likely 
distinguish the two cases.  The industry at issue in Topco has 
none of the special features that characterize professional 
sports, and many commentators agree that Topco would not 
likely be decided the same way under modern economic 
theory.89 
Ironically, perhaps the best argument for applying the per 
se rule is that some sports franchises have argued this is the 
appropriate test.  In a 2008 challenge to a newly adopted 
National Hockey League (“NHL”) rule forcing clubs to devote 
a portion of their websites to league activities, the New York 
Rangers asserted that agreements to “ban out-of-market 
broadcasting of a team’s games” were “specific horizontal 
agreements . . . that severely restrict individual team 
competition, and consumer choice, in areas such as 
broadcasting.”90  Similarly, in a 2009 bankruptcy court 
adversary proceeding brought by the Phoenix Coyotes against 
the NHL, the Coyotes argued, “[t]he NHL and its members 
 
 85.  GAVIL, supra note 76, at 128.  
 86.  United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972). 
 87.  Id.  
 88.  Id. at 608. 
 89.  See e.g., Charles F. Rule, The Administration’s Views on Joint Ventures, 54 
ANTITRUST L.J. 1121, 1123 (1985) (concluding that Topco would not be decided the 
same way under more recent antitrust law).  
 90.  Plaintiffs’ Motion in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Madison 
Square Garden, L.P. v. Nat’l Hockey League, 2007 WL 3254421 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d, 
270 F. App’x 56 (2d Cir. 2008). NHL Center Ice is the NHL’s out-of-market internet 
package.  
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have conspired to create exclusive television and radio 
broadcast rights within designated territories through 
contracts within individual NHL members, thereby 
maintaining monopoly power within each team’s ‘home 
territory’ by preventing others from broadcasting events 
within those territories.”91 
Despite the Rangers’ and Coyotes’ arguments, courts are 
unlikely to apply the per se rule because restraints in the 
sports industry are simply not suited for evaluation under the 
per se rule.  Since the Supreme Court’s decision in National 
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Board of Regents of the University 
of Oklahoma,92 discussed infra, courts have consistently 
refused to apply the per se rule to disputes involving 
professional sports leagues, holding that the per se rule is 
inappropriate in an industry where cooperation among 
competitors is necessary.  For instance, when the Oakland 
Raiders challenged the NFL’s exclusive home territory 
provision in an attempt to move the club to Los Angeles in the 
1980s, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that, although the 
rule “divides markets among the 28 teams, a practice 
presumed illegal . . . the unique structure of the NFL 
precludes application of the per se rule.”93 
Thus, it highly unlikely that a court would review the 
legality of MLB’s blackout policy under the per se rule.  The 
question of whether the “quick look” or the “rule of reason” 
should be applied is a closer call. 
C. Rule of Reason 
On the opposite end of the continuum from the per se test 
is the rule of reason, which is applied when a restraint’s effect 
on competition is not obvious.94  In a rule of reason analysis, a 
court must look at the totality of the circumstances, which 
 
 91.  Second Amended Complaint, In re Dewey Ranch Hockey, LLC, 414 B.R. 577 
(Bankr. D. Ariz. 2009) (Nos. 09-bk-09488, 09-bk-09500, 09-bk-09491, 09-bk-09495, 2:09-
bk-09488, 2:09-ap-494-RTBP), 2009 WL 1569963.  
 92.  Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 
85, 117 (1984).  
 93.  L.A. Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. Nat’l Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1392 
(9th Cir. 1984). 
 94.  See Cont’l Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 277 F. 3d 499, 509 (4th Cir. 
2002) (explaining that the rule of reason is applied to “restraints whose net impact on 
competition is particularly difficult to determine.”).  
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may include detailed economic analyses of market power,95 in 
order to determine whether the challenged conduct amounts 
to an unreasonable restraint of trade.96  In the often-cited 
language of Justice Brandeis, courts consider factors such as 
“the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is 
applied . . . the nature of the restraint and its effect . . . [t]he 
history of the restraint,” and “the purpose or end sought to be 
attained.”97 
A rule of reason analysis consists of three stages.98  First, 
the plaintiff must show that the restraint presents 
anticompetitive harm.99  As discussed supra Part I, a properly 
pleaded complaint must allege that the defendant’s conduct is 
harmful to competition as a whole in a relevant market, not 
that that it merely has an adverse effect on competitors or 
consumers.100  A plaintiff may be able to demonstrate 
anticompetitive harm through the use of direct evidence, such 
as reduced output, higher prices, or reduced consumer choice, 
or through circumstantial evidence, such as a detailed 
economic industry analysis consisting of a relevant product 
market and proof of market power.101  If the plaintiff meets its 
 
 95.  Market power is the ability to control prices. See Ball Mem’l Hosp., Inc. v. Mut. 
Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1335 (7th Cir. 1986) (defining market power as “the 
ability to cut back the market’s total output and so raise price.”).  
 96.  United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating that 
under the rule of reason a court must look at “all of the circumstances of a case in 
deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an 
unreasonable restraint on competition.”) (internal quotations omitted).  
 97.  Bd. of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).  
 98.  See K.M.B Warehouse Distribs., Inc. v. Walker Mfg. Co., 61 F.3d 123, 127 (2d 
Cir. 1995) (“Establishing a violation of the rule of reason involves three steps.”); James 
T. McKeown, The Economics of Competitive Balance: Sports Antitrust Claims after 
American Needle, 21 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 517, 529 (“Courts typically apply a three-
step rule of reason analysis.”). 
 99.  McKeown, supra note 98, at 529 (“First, the plaintiff must show an 
anticompetitive effect.”). 
 100.  See E&L Consulting, Ltd. v. Doman Indus., Ltd., 472 F.3d 23, 31 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(affirming dismissal of a complaint because it “simply does not allege . . . ‘that the 
challenged action has had an actual adverse effect on competition as a whole in the 
relevant market.’”).  
 101.  See GAVIL, supra note 76, at 186 (“Circumstantial evidence . . . would consist of 
market definition, a calculation of market shares, and an inference from high market 
shares that the defendants had the capacity to harm competition, i.e., market power. 
Direct evidence . . . [is] evidence of actual anticompetitive effects, of the exercise of 
market power, such as reduced output, higher prices, or diminished quality.”); see also 
Realcomp II, Ltd. v. F.T.C., 635 F.3d 815, 825 (6th Cir. 2011) (“When restraints are not 
per se unlawful, and their net impact on competition not obvious, the conventional rule-
of-reason approach requires courts to engage in a thorough analysis of the relevant 
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burden of showing that a defendant’s practice has adverse 
effects on competition in a relevant market, then the second 
step of the rule of reason requires the defendant to offer 
procompetitive justifications for its conduct.102  If the 
defendant is able to do so, then the court applies a balancing 
test that weighs procompetitive and anticompetitive effects to 
determine whether a restraint is net anticompetitive.103 
If Baseball’s broadcasting model did not involve exclusive 
home television territories, the rule of reason would 
undoubtedly be the appropriate test for evaluating the 
exclusive vertical distribution agreements between clubs and 
RSNs.104  Unlike horizontal agreements between competitors 
at the same market level, vertical distribution arrangements 
are justified by numerous procompetitive benefits.  For 
example, although exclusive vertical distributorships inhibit 
“intrabrand”105 competition for a supplier’s products by 
granting dealers monopolies in defined geographic areas, they 
can also bring about distribution efficiencies by helping to 
alleviate the “free rider” effect,106 and by encouraging retailers 
to engage in promotional activities that otherwise might not 
 
market and the effects of the restraint in that market.”). 
 102.  See Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., 610 F.3d 820, 830 (3rd Cir. 
2010) (“The plaintiff bears an initial burden under the rule of reason of showing that 
the alleged combination or agreement produced adverse, anticompetitive effects within 
the relevant product and geographic markets.  The plaintiff may satisfy this burden by 
proving the existence of actual anticompetitive effects or defendant’s market power.  If 
a plaintiff meets his initial burden of adducing adequate evidence of market power or 
actual anti-competitive effects, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the 
challenged conduct promotes a sufficiently pro-competitive objective.” (quoting United 
States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668 (3d Cir. 1993)). 
 103.  See Bd. of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (“The 
true test of illegality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and 
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even 
destroy competition.”). 
 104.  See HOLMES & MANGIARACINA, supra note 26, at § 2:14 (“[V]ertical nonprice 
restraints are governed by the far more flexible rule of reason”); see also GAVIL, supra 
note 76, at 352 (explaining that vertical restraints are agreements between firms 
operating at different levels of a market structure).   
 105.  “Intrabrand” restraints are restraints that “affect competition between sellers 
of the same brand—such as rival Chevrolet dealers.” GAVIL, supra note 76, at 352.  
They may be contrasted with “interbrand” restraints, which “limit competition between 
competing brands, such as Chevrolet and Ford.” Id.; see also Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE 
Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).  
 106.  See McKeown, supra note 98, at 527 (defining free riding as “a form of 
externality that exists when the actions of one firm benefit another firm without the 
latter firm (the free rider) having to pay for that benefit.”).  
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be worthwhile.107  Because vertical restraints present benefits 
as well as harms to competition, the rule of reason is applied 
as a balancing test: if the benefits outweigh the harms, the 
restraint will be upheld; if the harms clearly outweigh the 
benefits, the restraint violates Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
D. Quick Look 
Finally, over time courts have determined that a full rule 
of reason analysis is not needed to assess the legality of every 
restraint that is not illegal per se.108  If a business practice has 
obvious anticompetitive effects but some procompetitive 
justifications, courts may apply an intermediate test known 
as the “quick look.”109  Under the quick look test, an economic 
industry analysis proving that a restraint is net 
anticompetitive is not required, and the burden instead shifts 
to the defendant to prove that there are legitimate 
procompetitive reasons for imposing the restraint.110 
The Supreme Court’s decision in National Collegiate 
Athletic Ass’n v. Board of Regents of the University of 
Oklahoma (“NCAA”) was integral to the development of the 
quick look standard.111  There, the challenged conduct 
consisted of agreements between the NCAA and its television 
partners that imposed limits on the number of college football 
games that could be aired each week and on the number of 
games each school could televise in a given season.112  
Recognizing that they could obtain significantly more 
lucrative contracts on their own, a coalition of large 
 
 107.  See Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 (1977) (explaining 
that exclusive vertical distribution agreements can have the benefit of “induc[ing] 
retailers to engage in promotional activities.”). 
 108.  Marc Edelman, Upon Further Review: Will the NFL’s Trademark Licensing 
Practices Survive Full Antitrust Scrutiny? The Remand of American Needle v. Nat’l 
Football League, 16 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 183, 198 (2011) (“In the middle of the 
spectrum, where an arrangement seems less nefarious, a court may instead apply the 
‘quick look’ test (sometimes also referred to as an ‘abbreviated’ Rule of Reason test).”). 
 109.  United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 669 (3d Cir. 1993) (describing the 
quick look test as “an intermediate standard.”). 
 110.  Madison Square Garden, L.P. v. Nat’l Hockey League, 2007 WL 3254421 at *6 
(S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d, 270 F. App’x 56 (2d Cir. 2008) (“A truncated rule of reason 
analysis, a ‘quick look,’ would indeed relieve the Plaintiff of its initial burden of 
identifying a relevant market and showing an actual adverse effect on competition.”). 
 111.   See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 
U.S. 85 (1984). 
 112.  Id. at 92. 
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universities with successful football programs brought an 
antitrust action against the NCAA under Section 1. 
After the plaintiffs provided convincing proof that the 
NCAA’s plan reduced output, made broadcasts unresponsive 
to consumer preferences, and essentially fixed the prices of 
network bids, the Supreme Court determined that no detailed 
industry analysis was needed to determine that the restraint 
was net anticompetitive.113  At the same time, the Court was 
not ready to declare the restraint per se illegal because it 
recognized that college football is an industry in which 
“horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the 
product is to be available at all.”114  Because neither the per se 
rule nor the rule of reason was appropriate for evaluating the 
restraint, the Court presumed the restraint was unreasonable 
but gave the NCAA the opportunity to rebut this presumption 
by offering procompetitive justifications.115   
In so doing, the Court planted the seed for an intermediate 
standard to be applied in situations where a defendant could 
have a legitimate reason for engaging in conduct that appears 
unreasonable on its face.  In the end, the Court rejected the 
NCAA’s contentions that the plan was needed to protect live 
attendance at games and to maintain competitive balance, 
and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs without requiring them to 
provide detailed economic proofs that the plan was net 
anticompetitive under the rule of reason.116 
Given the slight probability of a court applying the per se 
test to a restraint in the professional sports industry, a 
plaintiff’s best shot at proving MLB’s broadcasting plan is 
illegal is to argue that the league’s conduct falls into the quick 
look category.  If a court can be convinced that “an observer 
with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could 
conclude that the [blackout policy] would have an 
anticompetitive effect on customers and markets,” then it will 
 
 113.  Id. at 108.  
 114.  Id. at 101. 
 115.  Id. at 117-119 (rejecting the NCAA’s proposed justifications). See also GAVIL, 
supra note 76, at 186 (“[T]he ‘quick look’ can be understood in evidentiary terms as a 
burden-shifting device: evidence of actual harm to competition gives rise to a 
presumption that the challenged conduct was an unreasonable restraint of trade and 
shifts the burden of production to the defendant to offer evidence that the conduct can 
otherwise be justified.”).  
 116.  NCAA, 468 U.S at 108. 
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apply the quick look.117  The quick look saves the plaintiff 
from having to prevail in litigation under the rule of reason, 
which is often extremely expensive and rarely successful.118 
E. The Rule of Reason is the Appropriate Standard 
Should the court in Laumann apply the quick look or the 
rule of reason?  As discussed, the court will apply the rule of 
reason unless it determines that MLB’s blackout plan is “so 
plainly anticompetitive” that it requires “only a cursory 
examination” to determine its illegality.119  Unfortunately for 
the plaintiffs, the presumption that the rule of reason applies 
to most restraints,120 especially those in the sports industry, 
will likely carry the day.  It is unlikely that the plaintiffs will 
be able to provide conclusive proof that MLB’s broadcasting 
plan is net anticompetitive in the absence of a detailed 
economic study to that effect.   
Furthermore, even if the court concluded that “no 
elaborate industry analysis”121 was needed to show the 
broadcasting plan leads to higher prices and reduced output, 
MLB would have the opportunity to prove that there are 
procompetitive justifications for its conduct.122  As long as 
MLB is able to produce some evidence of procompetitive 
effects, such as proof that the restrictions enhance the 
“character and quality of the product,”123 a court must weigh 
these considerations under a full-blown rule of reason 
analysis.124 
 
 117.  Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999).  
 118.  See Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st 
Century, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 830 (2009).  
 119.  Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 7 n.3 (2006).  
 120.  See id. at 5 (“[T]his Court presumptively applies rule of reason analysis.”).  
 121.  Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 US 679, 692 (1978). 
 122.  See Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 
U.S. 85, 104 (“Whether the ultimate finding is the product of a presumption or actual 
market analysis, the essential inquiry remains the same—whether or not the 
challenged restraint enhances competition.”). 
 123.  See id. at 102.  
 124.  See United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 669 (3d Cir. 1993) (“If the 
defendant offers sound procompetitive justifications, . . . the court must proceed to 
weigh the overall reasonableness of the restraint using a full-scale rule of reason 
analysis.”).  Furthermore, the summary judgment determination in Laumann provides 
no reason to doubt that the case will ultimately be decided under the rule of reason.  In 
denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss, Judge Scheindlin cited American Needle for 
the proposition that “‘[w]hen restraints on competition are essential if the product is to 
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III. RULE OF REASON: STEP ONE  
A. Reduced Output and Anticompetitive Harm  
As discussed supra Part II, the rule of reason evaluates 
whether a restraint is net anticompetitive by weighing the 
harm it presents to competition against the benefits it 
provides to consumers.125  The first stage in the three-step 
rule of reason analysis requires the plaintiff to allege that the 
challenged restraint has resulted in harm to competition.126  
Reduced output is one of the most commonly recognized forms 
of anticompetitive harm.127  Output restrictions brought about 
by anything other than natural market forces harm 
competition by raising prices and impairing competitors’ 
ability to compete on the merits.128 
NCAA makes it clear that whether a broadcast plan 
artificially reduces output is a pivotal consideration in 
determining whether it violates the Sherman Act.129  There, 
 
be available at all,’ per se rules of illegality are inapplicable, and instead the restraint 
must be judged according to the flexible Rule of Reason.” Laumann v. Nat’l Hockey 
League, 907 F. Supp. 2d 465, 490 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l 
Football League, 130 S.Ct. 2201, 2216 (2010) (quoting NCAA, 468 U.S. at 101)).  The 
court also relied on the holding in Major League Baseball Properties, Inc. v. Salvino, 
Inc., 542 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2008) that  “agreements by individual clubs to grant the 
League the exclusive right to license use of certain rights originally held by the 
individual clubs are analyzed under the rule of reason.” Laumann, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 
490.   
 125.  See id. at 485-87 (framing the issue before the court as whether the “multi-
level conspiracy consisting of horizontal and vertical agreements implicating the 
League defendants, the RSNs and the MVPDs” has an “anticompetitive effect that [is] 
harmful to the consumer” or whether it “‘stimulates competition . . . in the consumer’s 
best interest.’”).   
 126.  McKeown, supra note 98, at 529 (“First, the plaintiff must show an 
anticompetitive effect.”).  
 127.  See Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic, Intern., Inc. 626 F.3d 1327, 1339 (11th Cir. 2010) 
(“Actual anticompetitive effects include, but are not limited to, reduction of output, 
increase in price, or deterioration in quality.”).   
 128.  See Gen. Leaseways, Inc. v. Nat’l Truck Leasing Ass’n, 744 F.2d 588, 594-95 
(7th Cir. 1984) (“An agreement on output also equates to a price-fixing arrangement.  If 
firms raise price, the market’s demand for their product will fall, so the amount 
supplied will fall too—in other words, output will be restricted. If instead the firms 
restrict output directly, price will as mentioned rise in in order to limit demand to the 
reduced supply. Thus . . . raising price, reducing output, and dividing markets have the 
same anticompetitive effects.”).  
 129.  Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 
85, 106 (“[R]estrictions on price and output are the paradigmatic examples of restraints 
of trade that the Sherman Act was intended to prohibit.”). 
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the NCAA’s plan was held to be anticompetitive because 
“[p]rice is higher and output lower than they would otherwise 
be.”130  Thus, one test of a broadcasting plan’s legality is 
whether it limits output to a level “lower than [it] would 
otherwise be” in the absence of the restraint.131  This test was 
relatively easy to apply in NCAA because the plan at issue 
there prevented schools from selling broadcast rights to all 
but three networks and capped the number of television 
appearances each school could make in a given year.132  
However, Kingray and Laumann reveal that the application 
of this test is not always so straightforward.  These cases 
show that different notions of how to measure output in the 
context of the sports broadcasting industry can lead to vastly 
different outcomes. 
B. The Kingray Approach to Output 
In Kingray, the plaintiffs alleged that the NBA and 
DirecTV conspired to restrict output and raise prices by 
making NBA League Pass available exclusively through 
DirecTV and blacking out games available on local RSNs.133  
NBA League Pass is a subscriber-based television package 
that allows purchasers to watch all out-of-market games 
subject to blackouts of in-market games that would otherwise 
be available.134  Essentially, it is the NBA’s version of MLB 
Extra Innings.  The Kingray plaintiffs alleged four theories of 
anticompetitive harm, including a claim for conspiracy to 
limit output.135 
 
 130.  Id. 
 131.  See Ross, supra note 51, at 476 (“The fatal flaw in the NCAA plan, according to 
the Supreme Court, was that output was ‘lower than [it] would otherwise be.’ The key 
issue, therefore, is whether viewership is lower because of the challenged contract than 
it would be if that contract were enjoined.”); see also Ethan Flatt, Solidifying the 
Defensive Line: The NFL Network’s Current Position Under Antitrust Law and How It 
Can Be Improved, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 637, 659-60 (2009) (defining output in 
terms of consumer welfare and stating that “consumer welfare can be said to increase 
when consumers (or viewers) have greater access to the television broadcasts.”).   
 132.  NCAA, 468 U.S. at 106.  
 133.  Kingray, Inc. v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1184 (S.D. 
Cal. 2002). 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  See Class Action Complaint for Violations of the Sherman Act, Clayton Act, 
and California Business & Professions Code and Demand for Jury Trial,  Kingray, Inc. 
v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1184 (S.D. Cal. 2002) (No. 00 CV 
1545 JM), 2001 WL 34674898.  
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The court dismissed all four claims, holding that the 
plaintiffs failed to allege anticompetitive harm.  Addressing 
the reduced output theory, Judge Lorenz found that blackouts 
did not bring about a reduction in output because every time 
a blackout is enforced on a certain channel, it still available 
on another channel.136  Because of this, the court held that 
“NBA League Pass’s black-out provision does not restrict 
output; it only affects what channel the game is available 
on.”137  Distinguishing NCAA, the court noted that NBA 
League Pass made over one thousand previously unavailable 
out-of-market regular season games accessible to 
consumers.138  This led the court to conclude that introducing 
NBA League Pass actually increased output by making more 
games available relative to the status quo ante.139  
Accordingly, the challenged restraint passed the NCAA test 
because it did not render output lower than it would 
otherwise be. 
C. The Laumann Approach to Output 
Similar to Kingray, the plaintiffs in Laumann alleged that 
the broadcasting restraints implemented by MLB and its 
television partners violated Section 1 because they resulted in 
reduced output and increased prices for consumers.140  
However, despite the fact that MLB and the NBA enforce 
viewership restrictions through the same kind of agreements 
among teams, RSNs, and MVPDs, Judge Scheindlin rejected 
Kingray’s holding that anticompetitive harm is not present 
when blackouts prevent fans from watching games on certain 
channels.  Although the court acknowledged that blackouts do 
not prevent games from being available to consumers on all 
channels, it declared, “[m]aking all games available as part of 
a package, while it may increase output overall, does not, as a 
matter of law, eliminate the harm to competition wrought by 
preventing the individual teams from competing to sell their 
 
 136.  Kingray, 188 F. Supp. 2d  at 1193 (“The NBA DirecTV contract provides that 
the only time a game is ‘blacked out’ on the NBA League Pass is because it is otherwise 
available to view on a free local over-the-air broadcast or via local and national 
channels.”).  
 137.  Id. at 1194.  
 138.  Id. at 1195. 
 139.  Id.  
 140.  Laumann v. Nat’l Hockey League, 907 F. Supp. 2d 465, 485 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).  
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games outside their home territories in the first place.”141  In 
other words, even if an out-of-market package makes more 
games available to consumers relative to the status quo ante, 
it may still render output lower than it would be when 
compared to a market with no restraints at all.  Thus, Judge 
Scheindlin held that the plaintiffs adequately alleged that 
MLB’s broadcasting arrangement presented anticompetitive 
harm in the form of reduced output, allowing the case to 
proceed to the second step of the rule of reason analysis. 
D. Total Viewership is the Proper Measure of Output 
Comparing Kingray and Laumann makes it clear that 
Laumann provides the more accurate measure of output and 
the better analysis.  Kingray fails to apply NCAA correctly 
because it defines output solely in terms of the total number 
of games available on television.142  The better definition of 
output in the sports programming context, as Laumann 
implicitly acknowledges, is total viewership. 
In finding that NBA League Pass increased output,143 
Kingray simply compared the total number of NBA games 
available on television before and after the introduction of 
NBA League Pass.  The flaw in this approach is that a 
broadcasting arrangement that increases output relative to a 
previous state of affairs may still significantly restrict output.  
Indeed, Judge Lorenz acknowledges that one reason NBA 
League Pass increased output is that, “with few specified 
exceptions, out-of-market games were not available to the 
public” prior to its inception.144  Thus, while NBA League Pass 
may have resulted in increased output, the increase was 
relative only to the prior, even more restrictive, distribution 
arrangement in place. 
The Laumann analysis is preferable because it takes a 
holistic view of the market as opposed to the narrower before-
and-after approach taken in Kingray.145  The assumption 
 
 141.  Id. at 490.  
 142.  Chicago Prof’l Sports Ltd. P’ship v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 754 F. Supp. 1336, 
1356 (N.D. Ill. 1991), aff’d, 961 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1992) (“Measuring output simply by 
the number of games gives an incomplete picture.”). 
 143.  Kingray, 188 F. Supp.2d at 1195 (“[O]utput of out-of-market NBA games 
increased by virtue of the NBA League Pass, rather than decreased.”).  
 144.  Id. 
 145.  See Bd. of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) 
LISOVICZ_PROTECTING HOME.DOCX  6/2/2014  4:59 PM 
230 Seton Hall Journal of Sports and Entertainment Law [Vol. 24 
underlying the plaintiffs’ position in both cases is that 
eliminating territorial restrictions would increase output in 
the market for live video presentations of games by giving 
clubs the freedom to negotiate television contracts with RSNs, 
MVPDs, and internet providers throughout the country.146  As 
Professor Stephen Ross explains, “[a]bsent restraints, 
individual teams would compete not only on the playing field 
and for playing talent, but for television viewers as well.  For 
example, the Chicago Bulls might be able to market their own 
games to stations across the country who would be interested 
in featuring performances by superstar Michael Jordan.”147  If 
this were the case, fans would have the freedom to subscribe 
to the RSN of their choosing regardless of their geographic 
location.  Increasing the variety of programming options 
available to consumers would bring about increased 
competition among clubs, RSNs, MVPDs, and internet 
providers, which would consequently drive down costs for 
consumers.148 
In this way, MLB’s broadcasting plan restricts output not 
because it limits the total number of games that can be seen 
on television, but rather because it limits total viewership.149  
Total viewership is a more accurate measure of output in the 
context of sports programming because the total number of 
consumers having access to games is a better reflection of 
product availability than the total number of games 
broadcast.150  Defining output in terms of the number of 
 
(explaining that the legality of a restraint is determined by, among other things, “the 
facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied” and “[t]he history of the 
restraint.”). 
 146.  STEPHEN F. ROSS & STEFAN SZYMANSKI, FANS OF THE WORLD UNITE! 15 (2008) 
(explaining that “[a]bsent the exclusive territorial arrangements agreed to by league 
owners, individual teams would either directly, or more likely via intermediaries, 
arrange for their own games to be available to out-of-market fans.”). 
 147.  Ross, supra note 51, at 467. 
 148.  See Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants Motion to Dismiss or in 
the Alternative for Partial Summary Judgment, Madison Square Garden, L.P., v. Nat’l 
Hockey League, No. 07 CV 8455, 2008 WL 4547518 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2008), 2008 WL 
2825036 (noting that fans “are deprived of alternatives that could be offered by 
individual clubs—such as the ability to purchase single games or the games of a single 
team—and of the lower prices that would result from such competition.”). 
 149.  See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motions to 
Dismiss the Complaints, Laumann v. Nat’l Hockey League, 907 F. Supp. 2d 465 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (Nos. 12-cv-1817, 12-cv-3704), 2012 WL 5272352.  
 150.  See Ross, supra note 51, at 478 (“The key issue, therefore, is whether 
viewership is lower because of the challenged contract than it would be if that contract 
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games broadcast leads to absurd consequences.  If this were 
the case, leagues could impose any arbitrary limitation on 
viewership, and as long as each game was available on some 
channel and at some price, there would be no reduction in 
output.151  For example, MLB could decide to make broadcasts 
available only on a pay-per-view basis for the cost of a ticket 
to the ballgame.  Even though this kind of plan would cause a 
vast majority of fans to forego watching games, under 
Kingray’s reasoning, such a restriction “does not restrict 
output; it only affects what channel the game is available 
on.”152 
Appreciating this reality, Laumann acknowledges that 
MLB’s plan reduces total viewership by “‘forc[ing] . . . 
consumers to forego the purchase of [these games] from other 
distributors [the individual clubs]’ resulting in decreased 
consumer choice and increased.”153  Thus, the Laumann 
plaintiffs stated a claim for anticompetitive harm under step 
one of the rule of reason by showing that MLB’s broadcasting 
plan uses agreements among economic actors to limit the 
total number of fans having access to games. 
IV.  RULE OF REASON: STEPS TWO AND THREE 
Once a plaintiff successfully states a claim for 
anticompetitive harm, the next step of the rule of reason 
shifts the burden to the defendant, who must come forward 
with procompetitive justifications for its conduct.154  If the 
court finds that the defendant’s justifications are legally 
cognizable, the final step of the analysis requires the court to 
balance competitive effects and to determine whether the 
 
were enjoined.”). 
 151.  Or, as the plaintiffs effectively point out, “It is no more correct to assert . . . 
that the only measure of output of sports telecasts is the number of games available 
than it is to say that the measure of output of books in the number of titles available.” 
Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss the 
Complaints, Laumann v. Nat’l Hockey League, 907 F. Supp. 2d 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(Nos. 12-cv-1817, 12-cv-3704), 2012 WL 5272352. 
 152.  Kingray, Inc. v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1194 (S.D. 
Cal. 2002). 
 153.  Laumann, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 490 (quoting Brantley v. NBC Universal, Inc., 
675 F.3d 1192 (9th Cir. 2012)).  
 154.  See McKeown, supra note 98, at 539 (“[T]he second step of a rule of reason 
analysis . . . requires the defendant to come forward with a procompetitive justification 
for the challenged arrangement or restraint.”). 
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defendant could feasibly adopt a less restrictive alternative.155  
At the balancing stage, a plaintiff will only succeed if it is able 
to prove that the restraint’s anticompetitive effects greatly 
outweigh its procompetitive benefits, or that a less restrictive 
alternative could easily be adopted.156 
In practice, courts rarely engage in the balancing of 
procompetitive and anticompetitive effects required by the 
third stage,157 and plaintiffs almost succeed under the rule of 
reason.158  Probably because courts are not accustomed to the 
difficult task of sifting through economic analyses of market 
power and weighing the harmful and beneficial effects of a 
restraint, the overwhelming majority of rule of reason cases 
are disposed of at one of the earlier stages.159  In fact, 
according to a recent study, only one of the past 222 antitrust 
cases to go to a final determination under the rule of reason 
was resolved in favor of the plaintiff.160  However, the same 
study showed that all but seven of the 222 cases never made 
it past step one of the rule of reason because the court found 
that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate anticompetitive 
harm.161  Thus, the fact that the court found an 
anticompetitive effect is undoubtedly a victory for the 
plaintiffs, and shows that the outcome of the case will turn on 
MLB’s ability to produce procompetitive justifications for its 
conduct. 
In its defense, MLB will likely assert that home television 
territories are needed to promote competitive balance, which 
courts have recognized as a legitimate interest in professional 
 
 155.  Id. at 542 (“The final step in a rule of reason analysis involves weighing the 
procompetitive and anticompetitive effects and evaluating whether less restrictive 
alternatives would satisfy the legitimate needs.”). 
 156.  See Capital Imaging Associates, P.C. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Associates, Inc., 
996 F.2d 537, 543 (2d Cir. 1993) (“Assuming defendant comes forward with 
[procompetitive justifications] the burden shifts back to plaintiff for it to demonstrate 
that any legitimate collaborative objectives proffered by defendant could have been 
achieved by less restrictive alternatives.”). 
 157.  Carrier, supra note 118, at 837 (“In the first decade of the twenty-first century, 
courts have continued their use of a burden-shifting framework in applying the rule of 
reason. They almost never balance.”); see also Edelman, supra note 108, at 203 (noting 
that antitrust plaintiffs face “an uphill battle.”).  
 158.  Carrier, supra note 118, at 830.  
 159.  See Daniel C. Fundakowski, The Rule of Reason: From Balancing to Burden 
Shifting, 1 A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST L. CIV. PRAC. PROC. COMMITTEE: PERSPECTIVES IN 
ANTITRUST 2-3 (2013).  
 160.  See Carrier, supra note 118, at 830. 
 161.  Id. at 829.  
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sports.162  It will argue that its broadcasting model helps level 
the playing field by limiting the disparity in television 
revenues earned by small and large market clubs.163  It will 
likely argue that giving individual clubs the ability to 
broadcast games throughout the country would exacerbate 
the existing disparity in television revenues by allowing large 
market teams to take an even larger slice of the pie to the 
detriment of smaller market teams.164 
If MLB can provide economic analyses to support their 
justifications, then the court will likely uphold the legality of 
the broadcast plan rather than attempting to balance the 
benefits of the arrangement against its harms.  If the 
defendants can show that the restrictions have the effect of 
“making the entire league successful and profitable,” then the 
court will likely find that they withstand scrutiny under the 
antitrust laws.165 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Although Laumann reached the correct conclusion in 
determining that MLB’s broadcasting plan harms competition 
in the market for live video presentations of professional 
baseball games, whether the plan runs afoul of the antitrust 
laws depends on whether a court accepts MLB’s 
procompetitive justifications.  If the league is unable to 
provide proof of the need for these restrictions, then the court 
will see no need to go through a full rule of reason analysis 
 
 162.  Major League Baseball Props. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 331-32 (2d Cir. 
2008) (“[C]ompetitive balance among the teams is essential to both the viability of the 
Clubs and public interest in the sport . . . .”). 
 163.  Although some of the difference in television revenues is redistributed among 
teams through the league’s revenue-sharing policies, the disparity among large and 
small market teams is still significant. For instance, taking into account money 
distributed through revenue sharing and from national television contracts, the Los 
Angeles Angels earned an estimated $119,610,000 in total television revenues in 2013 
whereas the Cincinnati Reds earned only $44,000,000.  Without revenue sharing 
policies in place, the Angles would have earned $123,150,000 in local television 
revenues while the Reds would have earned only $10,000,000.  See Dave Warner, How 
MLB Splits Your TV Dollars, AWFUL ANNOUNCING (May 17, 2013), 
http://www.awfulannouncing.com/2013/may/how-mlb-splits-your-tv-dollars.html. 
 164.  Judge Scheindlin hints at other potential justifications, such as that 
“‘individual [teams] are inherently unable to compete fully effectively’ or that the 
agreements are ‘necessary to maintain a competitive balance.’” Laumann v. Nat’l 
Hockey League, 907 F. Supp. 2d 465, 491 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 165.  Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2206 (2010). 
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and will instead apply the quick look test to strike down the 
current model.  If MLB can provide legally cognizable 
procompetitive justifications, then the rule of reason applies 
and the court will almost certainly conclude that dividing the 
market for baseball games into exclusive home television 
territories and “granting the Leagues exclusive rights to 
distribute out-of-market programming . . . [is] reasonable and 
in compliance with antitrust law.”166 
 
 
 166.  Laumann, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 490.  
